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Gely: Where Are We Now?: Life After Electromation

WHERE ARE WE NOW?: LIFE AFTER
ELECTROMATION
Rafael Gely*

I.

INTRODUCTION

There probably has not been as much expectation concerning a
recent NLRB decision, as that surrounding the two decisions that

were supposed to settle the debate on the legality of workplace
cooperative efforts: Electromation Inc.,1 and E.I du Pont.2 To a
large extent, the Board itself was responsible for the degree of anxiety generated in anticipation of these decisions. In a rarely used
process, the Board first announced it would hold oral arguments on
the case, and would accept amici-briefs from various organizations
interested in the outcome.3 Even more unusual, was the Board's
decision to reopen the record several days after the conclusion of
oral arguments to accept additional post-argument briefs.4 The
Board's members also added to the expectation by making public
statements inanticipation of the final decision that conveyed the
impression that the section 8(a)(2) problem was approaching a crucial crossroads,' and by taking over a year and four months to issue
their final decision.
* Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.
B.A. 1984, Kansas State University; A.M. 1987, Labor Relations, University of Illinois; PhD
1992, Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations University of Illinois; J.D. 1987, University of
Illinois College of Law. I thank Martin Malin for his helpful comments and consultation on
earlier drafts of this Article. This Article was written with support of the Marshall-Ewel
Research Fund at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
2. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
3. See NLRB Set to Examine Employer Domination of Joint Labor-Management
Committees, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 160, at A-1 (Aug. 19, 1991).
4. See CongressionalGroup Urges Preservation of ParticipationPrograms in Brief to
NLRB, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at A-9 (Feb. 3, 1992).
5. See Member Raudabaugh Forecast NLRB Ruling in Electromation Case Before
December 1992, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 141, at A-4 (July 22, 1992). For example,
Member Raudabaugh was reported as saying, "I've been studying [the Electromation case],
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Not only were the expectations great, but in their aftermath, the
decisions generated an avalanche of commentary in both academic
and practitioner circles. On the one hand, employers and groups
representing employers' interests, saw the Board's decision in Electromation as putting workplace cooperative efforts in danger of
extinction.6 Proponents of this position viewed the Board's decision as making it virtually impossible for employers to continue
experimentation with workplace cooperative efforts.7 These critics
accused the Board of introducing "a fatal ambiguity and uncertainty" to the question of how employers could create workplace
cooperative efforts that would withstand legal challenge. 8 The decision, opponents feared, would have a "chilling effect" on employers' willingness to introduce participatory efforts in their workplaces. 9
Consistent with this apocalyptic view of Electromation, was the
reaction by the Republican majority in Congress which, following
the 1994 election where the Republican party regained control of
both houses of Congress, introduced the Teamwork for Employees
and Managers Act of 1995 ("TEAM Act").'" When introducing the
TEAM Act, Representative Gunderson followed the well established "competitive environment" argument by stating that the
"[e]scalating demands of global competition have compelled an
increasing number of employers in the United States to make draand studying it, and studying it because its been made into a major deal." Id. See also
NLRB Decision in ElectromationInc. Imminent, BoardMembers Tell Conference, Daily Lab.

Rep. (BNA) No. 240, at A-14 (Dec. 14, 1992) (quoting Member Devaney as saying, "[The
decision in Electromation] is not out because it's a very difficult and complex issue, it will
have tremendous impact").
6. See Gregory J. Kamer et al., The New Legal Challenge to Employee Participation,45
LAB. L.J. 41 (1994).
7. See Peter E. Millspaugh, The NLRB and the Employee Movement, 45 LAB. L.J. 259,
275 (1994).
8. See id.
9. See id. See also Kamer, supra note 6, at 41.
10. See H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 295, 104th Cong. (1995). The TEAM Act was
approved by both houses, but was then vetoed by President Clinton. See Employee
Participation:Clinton Vetoes TEAM Act Despite PleasFrom Business ForPassage,Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 147, at D-4 (July 31, 1996). Companion bills, similar to the bill vetoed by
President Clinton, were introduced early this year in the House and Senate. See HR. 634,
105th Cong. (1997); S. 295, 105th Cong. (1997). The Senate bill was approved by the Senate
Labor and Human Resources Committee on March 6,1997. See Legislation: GOP Workplace
ProposalsAwaiting Completion When Congress Returns, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 166, at
C-1 (Aug. 27, 1997).
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matic changes in workplace and employer-employee relationships"
of the kind that involve an "enhanced role for the employee in
workplace decision-making."" He noted that employee involvement programs are widely used across the United States;12 that
recent surveys indicate employees want more involvement in decisions affecting them in the workplace; 3 and that the NLRB's current interpretation of section 8(a)(2) is constrained by a mindframe more attune to the "very turbulent time in labor-management relations" than to the 1990's workplace.' 4 Gunderson concluded that an amendment to section 8(a)(2) was needed to nurture
workplace creativity and confront "America's greatest economic
challenges."' 5
In its Findings and Purposes section, the TEAM Act generally
recites the "competitive environment" argument, as well as stating
that the establishment of participatory programs has a positive
impact on productivity, competitiveness and the lives of employees.' 6 Its "Finding" section concludes with the argument that
recent attempts by employers to establish these participatory programs "have not done so to interfere with the collective bargaining
rights guaranteed by the labor laws, as was the case in the 1930's
when employers established deceptive sham 'company unions' to
avoid unionization,"' 7 but that nonetheless, employee involvement
programs are currently threatened by the Board's prohibition
against employer-dominated "company unions."' 8
The TEAM Act states as its purposes "(1) to protect legitimate
Employee Involvement programs against governmental interference; (2) to preserve existing protections against deceptive, coercive
employer practices; and (3) to allow legitimate Employee Involvement programs to continue to evolve and proliferate."' 9 To accom11. H.R. 743, 104th Cong. § 2(a)(1), (2) (1995). See also Statement by Rep. Gunderson
and Text of the Teamwork for Employees and ManagersAct, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 20,
at D-5 (Jan. 31, 1995).
12. See Statement by Rep. Gunderson supra note 11, at D-5.
13. See id. (citing a survey by the Princeton Survey Research Associates on behalf of
Professors Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers).
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. See H.R. 743, 104th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (1995).
17. Id. at § 2(a)(6).
18. See id. at § 2(a)(7).
19. Id. at § 2(b)(1)-(3).
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plish these three objectives, the bill asked Congress to amend
section 8(a)(2), by adding the following proviso:
Provided further, That it shall not constitute or be evidence of an
unfair labor practice under this paragraph for an employer to
establish, assist, maintain or participate in any organization or
entity of any kind, in which employees participate to address
matters of mutual interest (including issues of quality, productivity and efficiency) and which does not have, claim or seek authority to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements
under this Act with the employer or to amend existing collective
bargaining agreements between the employer and any labor
organization.2 °
This apocalyptic view of the Board's holding in Electromation
was confronted, interestingly enough, not with enthusiastic support
for the Board's decision, but with a somewhat dismissive and much
guarded attitude. As discussed below, 21 in both its Electromation
and E.I. du Pont decisions, various members of the Board filed concurring opinions emphasizing the limited nature of the Board holdings, and their general support for the continuing experimentation
with workplace cooperative efforts. In later writings, some of the
members who wrote concurring opinions have continued to adhere
to this view that the Board's holdings did not represent a big shift in
8(a)(2) interpretation.22 Member Devaney, who had been quoted
as saying before the Electromation decision was issued that the
holding will have "tremendous impact," has, both in his concurring
opinion and in a later article, advanced the argument that the
alarmist interpretation of Electromation has been essentially
misguided.'
Given the expectations that preceded the Board's decisions, and
the reactions that followed, it is somewhat surprising how little
attention has been given to the decisions the NLRB has issued since
Electromationand E.I. du Pont. While in general these recent decisions are consistent with the holdings in Electromation and E.I du
Pont, they provide us with the opportunity to analyze the manner in
which the Board is currently dealing with the legality of workplace
20. S. 295, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995).
21. See infra notes 32 to 72 and accompanying text.
22. See Dennis M. Devaney, Much Ado About Section 8(a)(2): The NLRB and
Workplace CooperationAfter Electromationand Du Pont,23 STETSON L. REv. 39, 40 (1993).
23. See id.
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cooperative efforts. This article explores that issue. Part II of the
article provides a brief overview of the workplace cooperative
efforts problem. Part III reviews the Board's decisions in Electromation and E.L du Pont, and describes the various interpretations
that were initially attributed to these two decisions. In Part IV, I
analyze the cases decided since these two seminal decisions. The
argument is advanced that while the Board generally continues to
follow the contours of the test developed in Electromationand E.I.
du Pont, the most recent decisions indicate a degree of uneasiness
with the current approach to the workplace cooperative efforts
problem. To the surprise of many, this, to some degree, was the
extent of the law before the Board's anti-climatic intervention. In
that sense, not much has changed. Part V concludes the Article.
II.

THE WORKPLACE COOPERATIVE EFFORTS PROBLEM

There are a large variety of workplace cooperative programs. 24
These programs include different employment arrangements
revolving around team or group activities, whose objectives are to

involve employees in the decision-making process. They usually
involve salaried and hourly employees coming together to share
ideas concerning quality improvements, waste reduction, and other
quality enhancing issues.'
Cooperative efforts have normally been classified along the following lines: Employee Participatory Programs (quality circles,
quality of worklife, and strategic participation), Teams, Gain-sharing, Profit-sharing and Employee Stock Ownership Plans.26 The
legality of the latter three types of programs has never been ques24. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Unions and Contemporary Innovations in
Work Organization, Compensation, and Employee Participation,in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC
CoMPmTrVaNEss 173, 176-78 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992) (providing a
description of selected programs, their characteristics and their effectiveness).
25. See WILLIAM N. COOKE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION: NEW PARTNmEasips
OR GOING IN CiRcLEs? 3, 4 (1990) (describing the structure and purpose of most labor and

management joint committees).
26. See Eaton and Voos, supra note 24, at 176-77. See also Samuel Estreicher, Employee
Involvement and the "Company Union" Prohibition:The Case for PartialRepeal of Section

8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 125, 127 (1994) (dividing cooperative efforts into
those that are grounded in natural work groupings ("on-line" systems) and those that are not

directly concerned with immediate productivity issues, and those concerned with issues of a
more general nature, such as organization-wide procedures and developments).
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tioned under section 8(a)(2).2 7 Thus, most of the cases dealing with
section 8(a)(2) normally involve employee participatory programs
and teams, or variations thereof.
The dispute as to the legality of workplace cooperative efforts,
has centered around the interpretation of two statutory sections:
section 8(a)(2) and section 2(5). Section 2(5) defines a "labor
organization" as:
[a]ny organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan in which employees participate and
which, exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.2 8
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer:
[t]o dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support
to it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and
published by the Board pursuant to section 156 of this title, an
employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to
confer with him during working hours without loss of time or
9
2

pay.

The NLRA thus establishes a two step analysis in reviewing the
legality of an employer-employee cooperative effort.3 0 First, does
the cooperative effort constitute a labor organization under section
2(5)?31 Second, if the cooperative effort is found to be a labor
organization, has the employer dominated or interfered with the
32
formation or administration of such an organization?
The case law interpreting these two sections can be classified as
either restricting or limiting the ability of employers to establish
27. See Lori M. Beranek, Comment, The Saturnization ofAmerican Plants:Infringement

or Expansion of Workers' Rights?, 72 MiNN. L. REv. 173, 189-94 (1987) (discussing how the
federal government has encouraged the creation of such programs).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (Supp. V 1994).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (Supp. V 1994).
30. See Wilson McLeod, Labor-Management Cooperation: Competing Visions and
Labor's Challenge, 12 INDus. REL. L.J. 233, 276-77 (1990) (stating that cooperation theorists
fear this analysis may bar alternatives to collective bargaining).
31. See id. at 277.
32. See id.
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workplace cooperative efforts, 33 or on the contrary, as facilitating or
permitting employers to establish these programs. 34 The "restric-

tive" view tends to limit the kind of participatory programs that
would be allowed under the NLRA, by giving an expansive reading

to sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2). 5 The "permissive" view, on the other
hand, seeks to expand the kind of programs that would obtain judi-

cial approval, by narrowly interpreting the definition of a labor
organization, and the kind of conduct that would amount to domi-

nation or support.36
III. ELEcTROMATION ANDY.
A.

DUPONT

Electromation

Electromation involved the question of the legality of five so
called "Action Committees," created by the employer in response
to concerns previously raised by its employees.3 7 In an almost apologetic tone, the Board concluded that the "Action Committees"
violated section 8(a)(2). 8 The Board's decision was structured
along the two separate inquiries suggested by the statutory
regime.3 9 First, "[a]t what point does an employee committee lose
33. See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959) (holding that neither § 2(5) nor
§ 8(a)(2) eliminated employee committees from the term "labor organization," which
resulted in a limitation on an employer's ability to create participatory programs).
34. See Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
"President's Advisory Council," created by the employer, and including employees'
representatives, which met with the employer to voice complaints about work related issues
such as leave policy and job bidding, was not "dealing with," but served merely as a "means
of communication").
35. See Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. at 218.
36. See Airstream, Inc., 877 F.2d at 1295-98, 1300.
37. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 990-92 (1992), enforced, 35 F.2d 1148 (7th
Cir. 1994). The "Action Committees" were formed as the result of a series of meetings that
management had held with employees to discuss the employees' displeasure with a number
of changes that had been made in an effort to reduce production costs. See id. at 990. "The
Action Committees were designated as follows: Absenteeism/Infractions; No Smoking Policy;
Communication Network; Pay Progressions for Premium Positions; and Attendance Bonus
Program." Id.at 991.
38. See id. at 990. The Board explained:
These findings rest on the totality of the record evidence, and they are not intended
to suggest that employee committees formed under other circumstances for other
purposes would necessarily be deemed "labor organizations" or that employer
actions like some of those at issue here would necessarily be found, in isolation or in
other contexts, to constitute unlawful support, interference, or domination.
3
e
39. See id.
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its protection as a communication device and become a labor
organization? ' 40 Second, what kind of conduct by the employer
constitutes domination and interference with the labor
organization? 4
In answering the first question, the Board applied a three pronged test.42 According to the Board, it will find a given group is a
labor organization if "(1) employees participate, (2) the organization exists, at least in part, for the purpose of 'dealing with' employers, and (3) these dealings concern 'conditions of work' or concern
other statutory subjects, such as grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, or hours of employment. ' 43 With respect to the issue
of whether the organization must also have as a purpose the representation of employees, the Board noted if that were the case, such
an organization will meet the statutory definition under section
2(5), if, in addition, it also meets the employee participation criteria
44
and it deals with conditions of work or other statutory subjects.
The Board found all the elements satisfied, and specifically commented on the meaning of the "dealing with" element.45 The
Board began by pointing out that the term should, and had been,
broadly construed to include situations other than bargaining.46
The Board emphasized that the Action Committees were created in
response to the employees' dissatisfaction with current employment
conditions and with the hope that the employees would help man4' 7
agement "to come up with ways to resolve these problems.
Thus, the Board concluded, it was clear that the Action Committees
were created in order to solve employment problems through a
bilateral process, which squarely fell under the "dealing with" element as interpreted in earlier cases by the Supreme Court. 8
40. Id.

41. See id.
42. See Electromation,Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 994.
43. Id.
44. See id. "Any group, including an employee representation committee, may meet the
statutory definition of 'labor organization' even if it lacks a formal structure, has no elected
officers, constitution or bylaws, does not meet regularly, and does not require the payment of
initiation fees or dues." Id.
45. See id. at 997.
46. See id. at 995 (discussing Cabot Carbon to illustrate the broad nature of the term
"dealing with").

47. See Electromation,Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 997.
48. See id.
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Having found the Action Committees to be a labor organization,
the Board then discussed the employer domination and interference issue.4 9 The Board's focus was on whether the organization
was the creation of management, whether the organization's structure and function were determined by management, and whether
the organization's continued existence depended on the fiat of management.5 0 According to the Board, since "the Action Committees
were the creation of the [employer] and [since] the impetus for
their continued existence rested with the [employer] and not with
the employees," it was clear that the employer dominated their formation and administration and unlawfully supported them.5 '
There were three concurring opinions filed in Electromation.5 2
The three concurring opinions set out to clarify various aspects of
the majority opinion.5 3 Whether the concurring members achieved
their objective has been the subject of substantial academic
debate.54 Member Devaney's concurrent opinion attempted to
clarify the majority's opinion by first indicating that under section
8(a)(2), there is significant latitude for employers to implement
workplace cooperative efforts. 55 Member Devaney noted that
although the term "dealing with" is much broader than the term
"bargaining," it is not so encompassing as to include situations
involving true communication devices, such as those participatory
programs discussing managerial issues like quality, productivity and
efficiency.56 Thus, according to Member Devaney, some forms of
bilateral exchanges, such as "soliciting and/or accepting employee
suggestions or ideas"5 7 will be permissible without running afoul of
the "dealing with" element of section 2(5).58 Finally, Member
Devaney attempted to answer a question left unanswered by the
majority's opinion: whether an employee participatory program can
49. See id. at 995.
50. See id. at 997-98.
51. See id. at 998.
52. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 998-1015 (concurring opinions submitted by
Members Devaney, Oviatt and Raudabaugh).
53. See id.

54. See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, Can TEAM Work? Implications of an Electromation
and Dupont Compliance Analysis for the TEAM Act, 71 NoTRa

(1996).
55.
56.
57.
58.

DAME L. REv. 215, 233-34

See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 999 (Devaney, M., concurring).
See id. at 1002 n.20.
Id. at 1003.
See id.
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ever be found to be a labor organization in the absence of the "representation" element. 9 In Devaney's view, a finding that an
employee group acted as a representative of other employees is
essential to the conclusion that such a group is a labor organization." According to Member Devaney,
[w]here an employee committee does not act as the agent or
advocate of other employees, an employer's dealings with the
committee will not cause the harm Section 8(a)(2) is intended to
correct: the usurpation by the employer of the employees' right
to choose their own bargaining representative and the concomitant frustration of their fundamental freedom of choice and
action guaranteed by section 7.61
A second concurring opinion was fied by Member Oviatt, again
stressing the limited scope of the Board's decision.62 In a fairly
apologetic tone, Member Oviatt recited the employers' cry for the
need of improving efficiency and productivity in order to "remain
competitive in the world economy,"'6 and the concern that present
laws might serve as "roadblocks to companies' ability to perform
more efficiently and to respond promptly to competitive conditions .... "s" According to Member Oviatt, the critical distinction
between legal and illegal workplace cooperative efforts relates to
the subject matter element.6 Member Oviatt described various
kinds of employee-participation groups most likely to be outside
the scope of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2). 6 Quality circles,67 quality of
worklife programs, 68 and employee-management committees, 69 are
59. See id. at 1002.
60. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1002.
61. Id.
62. See id at 1003 (Member Oviatt, concurring).
63. Id
64. Id. at 1004.
65. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1004.
66. See id.
67. See id. (defining quality circles as committees "whose purpose is to use employee
expertise by having the group examine certain operational problems such as labor efficiency
and material waste").
68. See id. (defining quality of worklife programs as programs involving "management's
attempt to draw on the creativity of its employees by including them in decisions that affect
their work lives," such as, "worker self-fulfillment and self-enhancement").
69. See id. (defining employee-management committees as programs "established by a
company with the purpose of creating better communications between employer and
employee by exploring employee attitudes, communicating certain information to employees,
and making management more aware of employee problems").
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not, according to Member Oviatt, within the reach of section 2(5)
since they are not concerned with the subject matters proscribed
under that section.70 Although Member Oviatt's decision appears
to be the most circumscribed of all the concurrent opinions, since
he arguably just intended to delineate the outer boundaries of the
majority opinion, the tone of his opinion has certainly influenced
later decisions by the Board.
In a third concurring opinion, Member Raudabaugh attempted to
shift the focus of the inquiry from the "labor organization" question
towards the "domination and interference" inquiry.7 ' According to
Member Raudabaugh, most [participatory programs] are likely to
satisfy the three requirements of section 2(5): employee participation, "dealing with" and "subject matter."72 In particular, argued
Raudabaugh, "[m]ost participatory programs involve the presentation of proposals or ideas to management, and a management
response to those proposals or ideas," and "it is uncommon for
[participatory programs] to have managerial functions fully delegated ....,7"Therefore, concluded Raudabaugh, most participatory
programs will involve employees "dealing with" the employer
within the meaning of NLRB v. Cabot Carbon,74 and thus will qualify as a labor organization under section 2(5). 75 Similarly, Member
Raudabaugh argued that the "subject matter" requirement most
likely will be met by every participatory program, since, even those
programs that attempt to limit their discussions to issues of productivity and efficiency will be likely to have to consider one or more of
the section 2(5) subjects in accomplishing the program's
76
objectives.
70. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1004-05.
71. See id. at 1005 (Member Raudabaugh, concurring).
72. See id. at 1007.

73. Id. at 1008.
74. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).

75. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1008-09.
76. See id. at 1008.
A "discussion of work problems" may include almost anything, including, for
example, poor lighting or inadequate ventilation in work areas. When employees

present to management "specific solutions and improvement recommendations"
regarding such matters, the "dealing with" standard of Cabot Carbon will always be

satisfied. Moreover, the subject matter of such "dealings" will usually include
matters which clearly fit within the examples enumerated in Section 2(5), such as
"grievances" or "conditions of work," if these terms are construed broadly.
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Thus, Raudabaugh instead directed his efforts toward the development of a set of guidelines to determine whether the "labor
organization" in question was dominated or interfered with by the
employer. Based on his reading of the NLRA's legislative history,
and on recent congressional developments which indicate a congressional policy in favor of employee involvement, Raudabaugh
argued that the Board should be free to reinterpret section 8(a)(2)
in a way that will "accommodate labor-management cooperation
and the Section 7 rights of employees. ' 77 Raudabaugh proposed
that the Board should look at the following factors when deciding
the domination and interference issue:
(1) the extent of the employer's involvement in the structure and
operation of the committees; (2) whether the employees, from an
objective standpoint, reasonably perceive the [employee participatory program] as a substitute for full collective bargaining
through a traditional union; (3) whether employees have been
assured of their Section 7 right to choose to be represented by a
traditional union under a system of full collective bargaining, and
(4) the employer's motives in establishing the [employee participatory program].78

Member Raudabaugh's interpretation of these four factors, illustrates a fairly expansive view of the types of workplace cooperative
efforts that would be permitted to operate outside the reach of section 8(a)(2). For example, with respect to the first factor, the extent
of the employer's involvement in the structure and operation of the
committee, Raudabaugh conceded that the fact that the employer
initiates the idea of a participatory program, or that the employer
suggests the rules and policies of the labor organization, is not sufficient to condemn it.7 9 Instead, Raudabaugh focuses on the decision-making process and on the extent of management participation
within the group." Note that Raudabaugh makes no mention of
the "continued existence" factor alluded to in the majority's decision, focusing instead on the decision-making characteristics of the
group, which in earlier cases has permitted the courts to find in
favor of workplace cooperative efforts in situations in which the
decision to continue the program rested entirely with the employer.
77. Id. at 1013.
78. Id.

79. See id.
80. See Electromation,Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1013.
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The three concurrent opinions, although agreeing in principle
with the rationale of the majority decision, appear to point to a
much more permissive view of workplace cooperation than what
the language in the majority decision would allow. The need "to
insure that American fiims successfully compete in a global economy" 81 was apparently of enough importance to the three Board
members who filed concurrent opinions, as to force them to leave
the door open for future revisions of the Electromation test.
B.

E.L du Pont

The employer in E.L du Pont had created six safety committees
and one fitness committee in one of its unionized plants.8 2 In
addressing the question of the legality of these committees, the
Board first dealt with the labor organization question. In applying
its Electromation three-part test, the Board concentrated on the
"dealing with" requirement.8 3 The Board defined the term "dealing with" as entailing "a pattern or practice in which a group of
employees, over time, makes proposals to management, management responds to these proposals by acceptance or rejection by
word or deed, and compromise is not required."'
With respect to the "pattern or practice" element, the Board
stated:
If the evidence establishes such a pattern or practice, or that the
group exists for a purpose of following such a pattern or practice,
the element of dealing is present. However, if there are only isolated instances in which the group makes ad hoc proposals to
management followed by a management response of acceptance
or rejection by word or deed, the element of dealing is missing. 5
In discussing the domination and interference issue, the Board,
unlike in its Electromation discussion, shifted its focus away from
the issue of whether the "continued existence" of the committees
81. Id. at 1014.
82. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 906 (1993). The safety
committees had operated for a number of years but had been limited as to managerial

participation. See id.
83. The Board found that the first and third elements of the Electromation test were

satisfied since there was no question that employees participated in the committees, or that
the committees had discussed some of the proscribed subjects. See E.I. du Pont,311 N.L.R.B.

at 894.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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depended on the fiat of management, and instead focused its discussion on the issue of the independence of the committees in terms
of their decision-making power. 6 The Board placed particular
attention on the fact that management maintained an implicit veto
power over committee decisions, given the requirement that all
decisions be made by consensus.87 Although the Board noted the
employer had the power to "change or abolish any of the committees at will," 88 this factor does not appear to have been central to
the Board's decision. The Board concluded that the operation of
the committees supported a finding that the employer dominated
the administration of all seven committees 89 in violation of section
8(a)(2).
As he did in Electromation, Member Devaney filed a separate
concurrent opinion to point out that the conduct engaged in by the
employer in E.L du Pont and which the majority found to be a violation of section 8(a)(2), would also be unlawful under Devaney's
"narrower and more historically focused perspective." 90 For the
most part, Devaney's opinion was similar to that in Electromation,
restating his "representation requirement" and his concern with
protecting the employee's freedom of choice. 91
In discussing whether the employer in E.I. du Pont had dominated the administration of the safety and fitness committees,
Devaney initially appeared to focus on the "continued existence"
issue. He states, "I find it difficult to conceive of a situation where
the very existence of an employee committee depends on the will of
the employer that would not merit a finding that the employer
'dominated' the committee." 9 However, in the next sentence of his
opinion, he takes the breath out of this argument by stating that "an
employer's domination of the administration of an employee committee is not, taken alone, an unfair labor practice." 93 According to
Devaney, the fact that the employer forms the committees, assigns
management representative to the committees, provides the committees with funds, time, space and compensation, controls the
86. See id. at 895-96.
87. See id. at 896.
88. E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 896.
89. Id.

90. See id at 898.
91. See id. at 899.
92. Id. at 901.
93. E.L du Pon4 311 N.L.R.B. at 901.
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agenda and could dissolve the committees at will, does not in itself
amount to a violation of section 8(a)(2).94 Even if the committees

are "dominated" in such a way by the employer, there is not necessarily any interference with the employees' exclusive right to

choose a bargaining representative. 95
Devaney's opinion has been interpreted as edging away from the

Electromation language, and instead advancing the permissive
model. 96 While this might be subject to debate, it is clear that such

language has reappeared as an underlying theme in later Board
decisions.
IV.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Overview

Given all the attention that the Electromation and the E.I du

Pont decisions have received in academic and practitioners circles,
it is somewhat surprising that very little attention has been given to
more recent NLRB decisions involving workplace cooperative
efforts. Despite the lack of public attention, the issue of the legality
of workplace cooperative efforts continues to be litigated at the

NLRB. Since the Electromation and E.I du Pont decisions, the
97
Board has decided twelve cases applying the Electromation test.

The decisions in these cases are interesting, in that they demonstrate that little has changed with respect to the interpretation of
94. See id. at 902.
95. See id.
96. See A. B. Cochran, III, We Participate,They Decide: The Real Stakes in Revising
Section 8(a)(2) of the NationalLaborRelations Act, 16 BERKELEY J. Emvn. & LAB. L. 458,499
(1995).
97. See Aero Detroit, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1996); Simmons Indus., Inc., 321
N.L.R.B. 228 (1996); Dillon Stores, [a Div. of Dillon Cos.], 319 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1995); Keeler
Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995); Reno Hilton Resorts Corp., 319
N.L.R.B. 1154 (1995); Stoody Co., Div. of Thermadyne, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 18 (1995); Vons
Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 53 (1995); Webcor Packaging, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1995);
Magan Med. Clinic, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1994); Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 312
N.L.R.B. 582 (1993); Research Fed. Credit Union, 310 N.L.R.B. 56 (1993); Ryder
Distribution Resources, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 814 (1993). There has also been an administrative
law judge decision not yet reviewed by the Board. See Polaroid Corp. & Charla Scivally,
N.L.R.B. A.L.J. Case No. 1-CA-29966, 30063, 30211 (June 14, 1996) (finding that an
employee participation group established by the employer to address issues of pay, policy,
benefit and practice, was a labor organization, and that by dominating the group, the
employer had violated Section 8(a)(2)). Employee Participation: Polaroid Unlawfully
Established,Dominated Employee Group,ALJ Finds,Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 120, at D6 (June 21, 1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, DLR File.
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section 8(a)(2). A review of these recent cases illustrates several
points. When deciding 8(a)(2) complaints, the Board has adopted
the Electromationlanguage, and it is likely that the Board will find
that a violation of section 8(a)(2) has occurred (ten out of the
twelve cases resulted in violations). 98 However, the Board appears
to have adopted a narrow interpretation of the Electromation test,
at times using language entirely consistent with the concurring
opinions filed in that case. In particular, following the appointment
of Chairman William Gould to the Board, 99 the language of the
cases appears to hedge towards a more flexible approach than that
suggested in Electromation.
B.

The Initial Four

The first four cases decided by the Board after the Electromation
and E.L du Pont decisions dealing with an 8(a)(2) complaint, were
decided prior to Chairman Gould joining the Board. All four cases
were decided against the employers, with the Board finding a violation of the Act in each situation. In general, these four cases represent a fairly straightforward application of Electromation. In
Research Federal Credit Union,100 for example, the employer, following the commencement of an organizing campaign by an outside
union, introduced the idea of employee involvement teams.' 0 ' The
teams were composed of representatives from each department in.
the company, as well as some management representatives, and discussed topics such as smoking policies, part-time benefits, and
annual performance reviews.1 °2 The expressed purpose of the committees was to provide a means for employees to formally address
matters of concern, and then to present these concerns together
with recommendations for their solution to the Board of Direc98. See Aero Detroit, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1996); Simmons Indus., Inc., 321
N.L.R.B. 228 (1996); Dillon Stores, a [Div. of Dillon Cos.], 319 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1995); Reno
Hilton Resorts Corp., 319 N.L.R.B. 1154 (1995); Vons Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 53 (1995);
Webcor Packaging, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1995); Magan Med. Clinic, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B.
1083 (1994); Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 312 N.L.R.B. 582 (1993); Research Fed. Credit
Union, 310 N.L.R.B. 56 (1993); Ryder Distribution Resources, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 814 (1993).
99. See Senate Confirms Gould Nomination to NLRB; Feinstein, Cohen and Browning
Also Approved, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at AA-1 (March 3, 1994). Professor Gould
was confirmed as NLRB Chairman on March 2, 1994. See id.
100. 310 N.L.R.B. 56 (1993).
101. See id. at 61.
102. See id. at 61-62.
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tors.'03 The Board affirmed the administrative law judge's decision,
finding that the committees were a labor organization, and that the
employer had dominated and interfered with their formation and
administration. 0 4
Very similar factual patterns were involved in Ryder Distribution
Resources Inc.,10 5 and Magan Medical Clinic, Inc.'1 6 In Ryder Distribution Resources Inc., the employer, in response to a union
organizing effort, created an employee participatory program called
the "Quality Through People" (QTP) program.' 0 7 The program
was described to the employees as a form of problem solving
among the employees. 108 The employees were initially unwilling to
participate in the program, but changed their minds after the
employer offered each employee $500 as a "good faith gesture."'1 9
Following a meeting in which the employees compiled a list of matters that concerned them, five "quality action" teams were created,
which included as members several employees and one supervisor
or manager." 0 Employees in each team received training in problem solving techniques, and on how to convince management that it
should implement the employees' proposed solutions."' As part of
the problem solving training, the employees were told that it was
important to poll other employees and to report the results of the
polls to the employer." 2
The administrative law judge found that the employer had violated section 8(a)(2) by dominating and interfering with the formation of the five employee groups, based primarily on evidence
introduced concerning the operation of the wages and benefits
committee." 3 The wages and benefits committee met with the
employer with the purported objective of finding a solution to the
problem of wages that was satisfactory to both the employer and a
large majority of employees. 1 4 After deadlocking on possible solu103. See id. at 62.
104. See id. at 65-66.
105. 311 N.L.R.B. 814 (1993).
106. 314 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1994).

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See Ryder Distribution Resources, 311 N.L.R.B. at 815.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Ryder Distribution Resources, 311 N.L.R.B. at 815.
See id. at 831, 32.
See id at 818.
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tions, the employee-committee members were directed to poll the
other employees concerning the employer's various proposals on
wages and benefits. 1 5
The Board upheld the administrative law judge's findings with
respect to the wages and benefits committee. 1 6 The Board focused
on the fact that the wages and benefits committee clearly was a
labor organization under section 2(5), since its purpose was to deal
with the employer." 7 According to the Board, the central purpose
of the committee was to address employees' dissatisfaction with
their wages, by creating a "bilateral process" involving the
employer and the employees." 8 The Board also found, consistent
with Electromation and E.L du Pont, that the employer had dominated and interfered with the wages and benefits committee, since
the whole idea was initiated by the employer, the employer used
cash incentives to motivate employees to participate, and more
importantly, the continued existence of the group rested with the
employer. 19
Magan Medical Clinic20 also involved a committee (the
"Forum"), created by the employer following an effort by employees to start an organizing campaign. 2 ' The Forum's stated purpose
was to provide a "fair and orderly procedure for airing employee
grievances involving wages, hours and terms and conditions of
employment."' 22 At its first meeting, the employee members of the
Forum were allowed to modify or change the set of rules initially
adopted by the employer when establishing the group. 23 In subsequent meetings, the employer told members of the "Forum" that "it
was their committee and that he could have nothing to do with
it."' Following these organizational meetings, the "Forum" met to
discuss grievances.'
Grievances were then presented to the
employer, and according to the administrative law judge's decision,
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
Ryder DistributionResources, 311 N.L.R.B. at 818.
id.
id.

120. 314 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1994).

121. See id. at 1084.
122. Id.

123. See id.
124. Id.

125. See Magan Med. Clinic, 314 N.L.R.B. at 1084-85.
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the "Forum" "was able to obtain favorable action on grievances
from [the employer]."' 6 The administrative law judge found that
while the employer had interfered with the formation and administration of the "Forum," there was insufficient evidence to conclude
that the employer dominated the group, since the group appeared
to have had an effective existence independent from the
employer.' 27 The Board affirmed the administrative law judge's
decision finding that the "Forum" was a labor organization and that
unlawfully interfered with its formation and
the employer had
2
administration.
In Peninsula General Hospital Medical Center,'2 9 the participatory program at issue, the Nursing Service Organization
("NSO"), had been in existence for close to twenty years, primarily
as a forum for the social and professional concerns of the employee
members.130 A few months before the start of an organizing campaign by an outside union, the chairman of the NSO commenced
efforts to "rejuvenate" the group.' 31 To accomplish this objective,
the employer directed employees to elect a representative from
each area "to attend NSO meetings and report back to the staff of
the area represented."' 32 During the ensuing months, and while the
organizing campaign was ongoing, the NSO met several times to
discuss topics such as wages and working conditions. 33 In one of
these meetings, a survey was distributed and collected, which was
intended to gather information regarding employee preferences on
wages and benefits. 3
The Board again upheld the administrative law judge's decision,
which in turn had applied the Electromation/E.I. du Pont analysis.'3 ' The administrative law judge had no trouble finding that the
NSO was a labor organization under section 2(5), again focusing on
the "dealing with" requirement. 36 With respect to the issue of
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1085.
See id. at 1086.
See id.
312 N.L.R.B. 582 (1993).
See id. at 583.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 585-87.
See Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 312 N.L.R.B. at 585-87.
See id. at 582, 588.
See id. at 587.
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interference and domination, the administrative law judge's focus
was on the role played by the chairman of the NSO, who was a
member of management. 137 The judge characterized the role
played by the NSO's chairman as that of an active participant
affecting fundamental changes in the group. 138 Unlike the judge in
Magan, the judge in PeninsulaGeneralHospitalmade no distinction
between dominance and interference, even though it can be argued
that given its long standing existence, the NSO had as much of an
independent
existence from the employer as the Forum did in
139
Magan.
C. The Turning Point
In short, in each of these first four cases, there was some form of
workplace cooperative effort either created or significantly altered
by management, which involved employees serving a representative
role, and whose existence depended on management's will. 140 Each
of the committees in these cases discussed subjects related to a statutory condition of employment. Given the facts of each of these
cases, it is not surprising that the Board found a violation of section
8(a)(2). The Board appeared to have closely followed the Electromation and E.L du Pont analysis.
The other eight cases involved somewhat more diverse situations.1 41 Also, these latter cases contain language that suggests a
certain degree of uneasiness with the legal standard established in
the two seminal cases, and a shift towards a limited reading of the
Electromation and E.I. du Pont cases. In Keeler Brass Automotive
Group, the Board confronted a grievance committee which, after
eight years of operations, was being restructured by the
employer. 42 There, the committee procedures and composition
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 312 N.L.R.B. at 587.

140. See, e.g., Magan Med. 314 N.L.R.B. at 1083; Peninsula Gen., 312 N.L.R.B. at 582;
Research Fed. Credit, 310 N.L.R.B. at 56; Ryder Distribution, 311 N.L.R.B. at 814,

141. See Electromation, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994); Aero Detroit, Inc.,
321 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1996); Dillon Stores, 319 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1995); Keeler Brass Automotive

Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1995); Reno Hilton Resorts Corp., 319 N.L.R.B. 1154 (1995);
Stoody Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 18 (1995); Vons Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 53 (1995); Webcor
Packaging Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1995).

142. See Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1110.
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were decided by the employer.143 Committee members were then
elected by employees to two year terms."' Evidence was presented
that the committee's decisions concerning grievances were not final,
but instead were submitted to the employer, who then decided
whether to approve or modify the committee's conclusions. 45 In
reversing the administrative law judge, the Board found that the
committee was a labor organization, 46 and that it was dominated
by the employer. 47
Although the majority opinion breaks no new ground in terms of
the Electromation type of analysis, the case's importance might lie
in the concurrent decision of Chairman William Gould.' 48 In his
concurrent opinion, Chairman Gould pays special attention to the
question regarding the degree of independence enjoyed by the
employee participation group.14 9

Chairman Gould cites with
50

approval, two prior NLRB cases, and the Seventh Circuit decision enforcing the Board's Order in Electromation.'5 ' According to
Gould, the Seventh Circuit applied the correct standard in determining the legality of workplace cooperative efforts. 52 In its decision reviewing the Board's holding in Electromation, the Seventh
Circuit noted:
The Supreme Court has explained that domination of a labor
organization exists where the employer controls the form and
structure of a labor organization such that the employees are
deprived of complete freedom and independence of action as
guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, and that the principal distinction between an independent labor organization and
an employer-dominated organization lies in the unfettered power
of the independent organization to determine its own actions. 53
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 1110-12.
id. at 1110.
id. at 1111-12.
id. at 1114.
Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1116 (1995).
id. at 1116-19 (Chairman Gould, concurring).
id.

150. See Mercy-Mem'l Hosp. Corp., v. Local 79 Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 231
N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977); Sparks Nugget Inc. v. Hotel-Motel-Restaurant Employees Union,
Local 86, 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977).

151. Electromation, Inc., 35 F.3d at 1148.
152. See Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1118.
153. Electromation, Inc., 35 F.3d at 1170.
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According to Gould, the question of the independence enjoyed
154
by the participatory program in question is a matter of degree.
At one end of the spectrum, there might be situations involving a
"minimal degree of employer involvement, 155 like the one encountered by the Seventh Circuit in the earlier Chicago Rawhide15 6 case.
At the other end of the spectrum, there might be situations like the
one in Electromation, involving a higher degree of employer involvement."5 7 Gould then proceeded to provide some guidelines to
deal with those cases that fall under neither extreme.158 First,
Gould suggested the Board should inquire about the creation of the
159
group, that is, how the employee group came into being.
According to Gould, however, this does not mean that in every case
where the idea to form a participatory program originates with
management there will be an 8(a)(2) violation. 160
[I]f, for example, the employer did nothing more than tell
employees that it wanted their participation in decisions concerning working conditions and suggested that they set up a committee for such participation, I would find no domination provided
employees controlled the structure and function
of the commit16
tee and their participation was voluntary. '
This portion of Chairman Gould's opinion is interesting in that it
echoes both the concurring opinion of Member Raudabaugh in
Electromation (stating that the fact that the employer initiates the
participatory program, or that the employer establishes the program's rules and policies, is not sufficient reason to condemn the
program under the Act), 62 and the concurring opinion of Member
Devaney in E.L du Pont,in which Devaney stated, "I see no unlawful behavior or threat to employees' Section 7 rights when employers form employee committees with management members, provide
154. See Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1118.
155. Id.
156. 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955). In Chicago Rawhide, the committee originated with the
employees and met outside the presence of management; management did not determine the
subject matters to be considered, nor who should serve on the committee, nor did
management have veto power over any committee recommendations. See id. at 166.
157. See Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1118.
158. See id. at 1118-19.
159. See id. at 1118.
160. See id. at 1119.
161. Id.
162. See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1013, 1014.
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such committees with funds, time, space, and compensation, assign
1 63
the committees agendas, and dissolve them at will.
In addition to this first suggestion, Chairman Gould also pointed
out that in deciding the "domination" question, the Board should
also look at the circumstances surrounding the creation of the participatory program."6 In the case at hand, Gould argued that there
were several factors pointing in the direction of a finding of no
domination, which included:' 6 5 the fact that the employer had not
created the committee in response to an organizing effort, the fact
that participation in the committee was voluntary and that all voting committee members were freely elected by the rest of the
employees, indicating that no domination was present. 6 6 However,
Chairman Gould maintained, the balance of factors pointed in the
direction of domination. 67 In particular, Gould was concerned
with the fact that the employer set the membership guidelines for
the committee, established the election procedure and conducted
the election, and that the committee could not make a decision
about when it would meet without the approval of the employer. 68
Although Chairman Gould's decision cited with approval the
Electromationtest, it also appears to place much more attention on
the domination issue than the Board did in Electromation's early
progeny. It is not clear, however, whether Chairman Gould's
guidelines to decide the question of domination tend to expand or
limit the scope of the Electromation test.
D.

Chairman Gould's Era

On December 18, 1995, three years after its ruling in Electromation, the Board issued five decisions in cases raising 8(a)(2) complaints.' 69 These five decisions provide some instructive insights
into the manner in which the Board appears to have settled in its
interpretation of the meaning of the Electromationanalysis. In particular, a review of these cases indicates that the Board appears to
163. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 902 (1993).

164. See Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1119.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.

168. See id.
169. See Dillon Stores, 319 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1995); Reno Hilton Resorts Corp., 319
N.L.R.B. 1154 (1995); Stoody Co., Div. of Thermadyne, 320 N.L.R.B. 18 (1995); Vons
Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 53 (1995); Webcor Packaging, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1995).
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be concerned with two critical factors. First, with respect to the section 2(5) question, the Board's main focus has been the "dealing
with" requirement. 7 ' In answering this question, the critical element has been the showing that there is evidence of a "pattern or
practice" of "dealing with" between the employer and employees. 17 ' Second, in deciding the second prong of its Electromation
analysis, i.e. whether there is evidence of domination or interference with the labor organization, the Board has paid close attention
to whether the workplace cooperative effort's "continued existence" rested entirely with the employer.7 2
In Stoody Co.,' 73 and Vons Grocery Co., 7 4 the Board, for the

first time since the Electromation decision, found in favor of the
employer in an 8(a)(2) case. Stoody Co. involved the creation, by
the employer, of a "handbook committee" which stated purpose
was "[n]ot to discuss wages, benefits, or working conditions, but
was to gather information about different areas in the handbook
that were inconsistent with our current practices, that were obsolete, or that were misunderstood by employees so we could get
them cleared up as soon as possible."' 75 At the first meeting in
Stoody, the committee engaged in some discussion concerning vacation time, as well as other non-proscribed subjects. 7 6 Shortly after
this first meeting, the committee was disbanded after the employer
found out that a union which had been attempting to organize the
77
workplace had filed 8(a)(2) "unfair labor practices" charges.
Although the members of the "handbook" committees were to act
as representatives of other employees, and although in their first
and only meeting the committee discussed and made proposals concerning vacation time (clearly a statutory subject under section
2(5)), the Board found that the "dealing with" requirement was not
170. See Dillon Stores, 319 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1995); Reno Hilton Resorts Corp., 319
N.L.R.B. 1154 (1995); Stoody Co., Div. of Thermadyne, 320 N.L.R.B. 18 (1995); Vons
Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 53 (1995); Webcor Packaging, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1995).

171. See Dillon Stores, 319 N.L.R.B. at 1250; Webcor Packaging, 319 N.L.R.B. at 1204;
Dennis M. Devaney, Much Ado About Section 8(a)(2): The NLRB and Workplace
CooperationAfter Electromation and Du Pont, 23 STETSON L. REv. 39, 47 (1993).

172. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 998.
173. 320 N.L.R.B. 18 (1995).
174. 320 N.L.R.B. 53 (1995).
175. Stoody Co., 320 N.L.R.B. at 18.

176. See id.
177. See id.
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satisfied. 7 The Board relied on a passage from its E.I. du Pont
decision stating that "dealing with" requires a showing of a
"[p]attern or practice, or that the group exists for a purpose of following such a pattern or practice" of employees making proposals
to management, and management responding to these proposals. 17 9
According to the Board, since the "handbook committee" met only
once, there was no evidence of a pattern or practice of "dealing
with" and that, contrary to the Administrative Law Judge's opinion,
even if additional meetings of the Committee had been held, the
meetings would not have resulted in proposals to management on
working conditions.'
A similar factual pattern was involved in the other decision in
which the Board refused to find a violation of section 8(a)(2). In
Vons Grocery Co., the employer had created a group devoted to
considering specific operational concerns and problems (the "Quality Circle Group").' 8 ' Several years after its formation, the group,
for the first time, strayed away from its consideration of purely
operational matters and discussed issues related to a dress code and
an accident point system. 18 2 After a couple of meetings in which
these two matters were further discussed, the group presented proposals to both the employer and the union representing employees
at the plant addressing their discussions.' 83 Following complaints
raised by the union, to the extent that the Quality Group had gone
beyond the scope of its allowable activities, the employer reassured
the union that no further discussion of topics other than operational
matters would be made in the group, and invited a union representative to attend all group meetings.""
Following a rationale similar to that utilized in Stoody Co., the
Board held that the Quality Group did not constitute a labor organization under section 2(5).1 85 According to the Board, there was no
evidence of a "pattern or practice" of making proposals to management on statutory subjects, nor was there a substantial likelihood
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See id. at 20.
See id.; E.I. du Pont,311 N.L.R.B. at 894.
See Stoody Co., 320 N.L.R.B. at 21.
See Vons Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. at 53.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 54.
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that the one incident in which
such subjects were discussed would
18 6
pattern.
a
into
develop
The other three cases issued on the same day as Stoody Co. and
Vons Grocery Co., provide some insight into the Board's interpretation of the "domination and interference" element of its Electroma8 8 and
tion analysis. In Reno Hilton Resorts, 87 Webcor Packaging,'
89
Dillon Stores,' the Board confronted workplace cooperative
efforts that clearly fit the "labor organization" definition of section
2(5) as interpreted in Electromation. The main issue in these three
cases was the question of "domination and interference." 90 In discussing this issue of domination, the Board focused on the fact that
in both cases, the management could cancel the groups at any time
without any input from the employees.' 9 ' Having found that the
groups' "continued existence" rested with the employers, the Board
went on to find that there was evidence of "domination and interference" as prohibited under section 8(a)(2). 192
An interesting aspect of both Webcor and Dillon Stores, and of
19
the last of the cases decided by the Board since Electromation,'
is
a footnote by Chairman Gould which has appeared in each of these
decisions. The footnote reads,
[Chairman Gould] notes that the control exercised by the
[employer] over the [committee or group] is such that the freedom of choice and independence of action open to employees is
186. See Vons Grocery Co., 320 N.L.R.B. at 54.
187. 319 N.L.R.B. 1154 (1995).
188. 319 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1995). The Board's order in Webcor was affirmed by the Sixth

Circuit in NLRB v. Webcor Packaging, Inc. 118 F.3d 1115 (1997). Where the Sixth Circuit
endorsed the Board's approach in dealing with section 8(a)(2) disputes. In a short, yet

interesting opinion concurring in the result only, Judge Ralph Guy, alludes to the highly
political context surrounding the section 8(a)(2) dispute.

Because I believe that the result reached in this case no longer reflects
congressional intent, it is with the greatest of reluctance that I concur. But for a
presidential veto of amendatory legislation passed by the congress, what Webeor
attempted to do here would be viewed against the backdrop of legislation more
hospitable to concepts like plant councils.
Id. at 1125.
189. 319 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1995)
190. See Dillon Stores, 319 N.L.R.B. at 1252; Reno Hilton Resorts, 319 N.L.R.B. at 1157;
Webcor Packaging,319 N.L.R.B. at 1211.
191. See Reno Hilton Resorts, 319 N.L.R.B. at 1157; Webcor Packaging,319 N.L.R.B. at
1211.
192. See Dillon Stores, 319 N.L.R.B. at 1252.
193. See Aero Detroit,Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1101, 1102 (1996).
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too strictly confined within the parameters of the [employer's]
making for the [committee] to be a genuine expression of democracy in the workplace.194
Chairman Gould's footnotes are consistent with his concurring
opinion in Keeler Brass, in which he indicated concern with the
degree of independence that the members of the participatory programs enjoyed. The Chairman's footnotes are also consistent with
the Devaney and Raudabaugh concurrent opinions in Electromation, emphasizing the idea of free choice of employees in the selection of their bargaining representative.
V.

CONCLUSION: WHERE ARE WE Now?

In looking at the Electromation progeny, one thing is clear, the
Board continues to struggle with developing a standard to analyze
the section 8(a)(2) problem. On the one hand, it appears, that the
Board is following the Electromation test, at least in format. In
determining whether the participatory program is a labor organization, the Board has consistently focused, as suggested by Electromation, on the "dealing with" element.' 9 5 However, the Board has
been less consistent on the manner in which "dealing with" has
been defined. While Electromation suggests a fairly broad interpretation of "dealing with," the Board's own dicta in that decision, the
language used in E.I. du Pont concerning "patterns and practice,"
and the way the "pattern and practice" language has been interpreted in later decisions, suggest a much narrower interpretation.
For example, while the majority opinion in Electromation makes
clear that "dealing with" should be broadly interpreted to include
most bilateral processes, 196 the concurring opinions suggested a
much more limited definition. According to the concurring opinions, "true communication devices" in which the employer solicits
and accepts
employees' ideas, should be permissible under section
197
2(5).

The Board has defined "dealing with" as requiring a showing of
"a pattern or practice, or that the group exists for a purpose of following such a pattern or practice," of employees making proposals
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at n.6.
See Electromation, Ina, 309 N.L.R.B. at 995.
See id. at n.21.
See id. at 998.
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to management and management responding to those proposals. 198
A broad interpretation of this definition, consistent with E.L du
Pont, will permit the Board to find a violation of section 8(a)(2)
based on "pattern or practice" evidence by past behavior, or on the
basis of evidence showing that such a "pattern or practice" is likely
to develop, i.e., a prospective application. That is, it should suffice
under this test, that the program under review has the potential for
generating a "pattern or practice" even though it has not done so at
the time of the Board's review. However, as evidenced by the
Stoody Co. and Vons Grocery decisions, it is not clear the Board
will be willing to consistently interpret the "pattern or practice"
concept prospectively.
With respect to the domination and interference question, the
Board's original position in Electromation,focusing on the "continued existence" of the committee as a central factor in finding domination, has also been subject to some modifications. In
Electromation, the Board paid close attention to the question of
whether the committee's continued existence depended entirely on
the employer's fiat. By holding that a committee which can be terminated at the employer's will is clearly dominated by the
employer, 199 the Board arguably was imposing a new requirement
for cooperative efforts: for a program to be legal under section
8(a)(2), it must be the case that it can be discontinued only with the
consent or approval of employees. In later cases, however, the
focus of the domination and interference question shifted from the
continued existence of the committee itself towards a question on
the decision-making characteristics of the committee.
Whether this particular aspect of Electromation is likely to survive in the long run is unclear, especially in light of the language
used in E.I. du Pont, as well as in other recent NLRB decisions. In
his concurring opinion in E.I. du Pont, Member Devaney noted that
the fact that the employer forms the committee and that the
employer can dissolve the committee at will, does not in itself
amount to a violation of section 8(a)(2). 0 Somewhat troubling
also are the concurring opinions of Member Raudabaugh in Electromation and Chairman Gould in Keeler Brass Automotive. In
198. See E.L du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 894.
199. See Electromation,Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 998.
200. See id.
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addressing the question of domination and interference, both opinions discuss the independence issue by focusing on the issue of the
origins of the workplace cooperative efforts. For example, in Electromation, Member Raudabaugh argues that the fact the employer
initiates the idea of a participatory program is not sufficient to condemn it.201 Chairman Gould makes a similar argument in Keeler
Brass. Chairman Gould noted that much of the initiative for cooperative efforts in the workplace has come from employers. 0 2 Consequently, he added, these cooperative efforts are not unlawful
simply because the employer initiates them.20 3 Missing from these
two concurring opinions, however, is any mention of the "continued
existence" element, a factor that was crucial to the Board's majority
in the Electromation decision.
Thus, it appears that little has changed since the "monumental"
Electromationand E.L du Pont decisions. The majority opinions in
those two cases, arguably provided the foundation for a significant
clarification of the legal standards surrounding the problem of
workplace cooperative efforts. A review of the decisions that have
followed the Electromationand E.L du Pont cases, however, makes
clear that a guarded and limited meaning, not much different than
the predominant view before Electromation,has prevailed. In particular, the language in the concurring opinions reminding us that
there was a substantial amount of room under the NLRA to experiment -ith workplace cooperative efforts, has resurfaced in later
cases, championed by a somewhat unlikely ally, Chairman William
Gould.
To the extent that not much has changed, certainly the concerns
voiced primarily by employers has been unwarranted. There is no
indication in the cases decided since Electromationand E.L du Pont
that suggests the Board is rushing to eliminate the ability of
employers to establish workplace cooperative efforts. In that
respect, the concerns on the extinction of participatory programs
was "greatly exaggerated." More importantly, however, is the
implication that the argument raised in this Article has for the proposed legislation to amend section 8(a)(2). Given that the Board
does not appear to have significantly altered the section 8(a)(2)
201. See id. at 1013.
202. See Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1119.
203. See id.
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analysis, any calls for radical legislative changes to the NLRA,
along the lines of the TEAM Act, should not be uncritically
adopted.
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